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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
AND
STATE BAR JOURNAL
VOLUME 36 SUMMER, 1961 NUMBER 2
WASHINGTON CASE LAW-1960
Presented below is the eighth annual Survey of Washington Case
Law. The articles in this survey issue have been written by second-
year students as a part of their program to attain status as nominees
to the Law Review. The second-year students were guided in their
work by the Casenote Survey Editor of the Law Review and by vari-
ous members of the law school faculty.
The case survey issue does not represent an attempt to discuss every
Washington case decided in 1960. Rather, its purpose is to point out
those cases which, in the opinion of the Editorial Board, constitute
substantial additions to the body of law in Washington.
ATTORNEY-CLIENT
Admissibility of Conscientious Objectors to the Bar. The Wash-
ington Supreme Court considered a conscientious objector's moral
fitness to practice law for the first time in In re Brooks.' The court
held that the absence of any sense of duty to protect his heritage of
liberty renders an applicant for admission to the bar morally unfit.
Robert Boland Brooks registered with his local Selective Service
Board during World War II. He was awarded the status of conscien-
tious objector under the terms of the Selective Training and Service
Act of 1940.2 Thereafter he was ordered to report to a civilian labor
camp to do work of national importance in lieu of performing military
service. He refused to report for civilian duty and notified his local
1156 Wash. Dec. 773, 355 P,2d 840 (1960).
2Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889 (now Selective Service Act of
1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), as amended, 62 Stat. 612, 50 U.S.C. App. 456(j) (1952).
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Selective Service Board to that effect. Persistence in refusal to report
led to trial and conviction3 of a felony.4 A sentence of three years in
federal prison was imposed. Twenty-two months of the sentence were
served.
Subsequently Brooks applied to take the Washington Bar Examina-
tion. The Board of Governors found that he was qualified to take the
examination with respect to age, education and residence. The appli-
cation was denied, however, because the Board of Governors deter-
mined that the applicant was not a man of good moral character. The
determination was predicated upon the felony conviction. At the time
of his application to take the bar examination, Brooks' position in
matters of conscience remained unchanged. He stated that should he
be conscripted for any duty in connection with a war effort in the
future, his course of conduct would be the same. It was further indi-
cated that he would urge others to adopt his beliefs.
The inherent power to grant or deny admission to the practice of
law in Washington lies in the supreme court.5 The court may establish
moral standards which attorneys must meet before being admitted to
practice but the standards must have a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness for the practice of law.6 The court's conclusion that
an applicant does not possess the requisite good moral character must
be based on evidence which rationally justifies such a conclusion.7
In its majority opinion the court deemed the applicant's moral char-
acter to be intrinsically defective. A claim to individual, constitution-
ally guaranteed liberties with no corresponding sense of duty to pro-
tect their source, made the applicant morally unfit. The court clearly
disavowed any purpose to punish the applicant for his past felony
conviction. Rather, it was concerned with his present denial of any
duty to defend his country. Although Brooks contended that his un-
willingness to serve need not disqualify him, since his age of fifty years
made it unlikely that he would be conscripted again, the court consid-
ered this unimportant. Personal unwillingness to serve was counted as
but one way in which the applicant might manifest his felonious prin-
ciples. The court did not enumerate other ways in which the applicant
might manifest his felonious principles but it may be assumed that the
3 Brooks v. United States, 147 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 878 (1945).
4 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 11, 54 Stat. 894 (now Selective Service Act of
1948, ch. 625 § 12(a), 62 Stat. 622, 50 U.S.C. App. § 462(a) (1952).5 in re Levy, 23 Wn.2d 607, 161 P.2d 651 (1945).
6 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
7 Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
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advice which he might give to others was foremost in its mind. Mem-
bers of the legal profession should not advocate violation of the duly
constituted law."
In the concurring opinion, the applicant's attitude and past conduct
were considered to be immoral because they were unreasonable. By
affording him the status of conscientious objector and making provision
for noncombatant work in a civilian labor camp, Congress had afforded
the applicant a reasonable course of action. His failure to pursue such
a reasonable course of action was unreasonable. It was not justifiable.
It was morally reprehensible. It was unreasonable because reasonable
men do not carry utopian, pacifistic ideals too far in this world of
tyrants and bullies who would devour our freedom. The opinion is
characterized by a frank acknowledgment that the court is making a
personal judgment, without the aid of an objective standard.
The dissenting opinion described the applicant's refusal to sacrifice
his conscientious principles for the sake of expediency as a highly
moral and admirable trait of character.
The court's arrival at three differently grounded conclusions bears
testimony to the difficulties encountered in passing moral judgment on
honest and forthright conduct which is based on firm convictions. The
case is significant, not for the court's diversity of opinion, but for its
willingness to become embroiled in a controversy over morality when
the decision might have been bottomed on other grounds.
Prior to being admitted to practice, each applicant must take the
Oath of Attorney.9 The Oath of Attorney contains an undertaking to
"support the constitution of the United States and the constitution of
the State of Washington."19 The constitutions of both the United
States and the State of Washington contain provisions for military
service. The United States Constitution empowers Congress "to raise
and support armies."'" The federal government enjoys the power to
raise and maintain armies without regard for the conscientious scruples
of individuals. 2 The Washington Constitution provides that, "all able-
bodied male citizens of this state between the ages of eighteen (18) and
8 In re Smith, 133 Wash. 145, 233 Pac. 288 (1925). A Washington attorney had
advocated violation of the established law in order to effect social reform, at various
meetings held under the auspices of the Industrial Workers of the World. In disbar-
ment proceedings he was held to be unworthy of the office of attorney at law.
9 RCW 2.48.210; Rule 5B, Rules for Admission to Practice, Washington Court
Rules (West 1960).
10 RCW 2.48.210; Rule 5C (2), Rules for Admission to Practice, Washington Court
Rules (West 1960).
"U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (11).
12 United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).
1961]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
forty-five (45) years except such as are exempt by laws of the United
States or by the laws of this state, shall be liable to military duty."'
8
While the applicant was no longer subject to duty with the Washington
militia because of his advanced age, he clearly had denied any duty to
perform military service. The problem thus could have appeared to be
one of his professed inability to take the Oath of Attorney without
mental reservation, as well as one of his moral character.
In In re Summers"4 an applicant was denied admission to the Illinois
State Bar on the ground that he would be unable to take the Oath of
Attorney. The oath contained an undertaking to support the constitu-
tion of the State of Illinois. The Illinois Constitution provided that the
state's militia should consist of all able-bodied, male residents of the
state between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years." The applicant
Summers' age made him subject to duty with the state militia in the
event that it was called to duty in time of war.' He had registered
with his local Selective Service Board and had been accorded the status
of conscientious objector.' Admission to practice was denied on the
specific ground that should the militia be called to duty in time of war 8
the applicant would admittedly be unwilling to serve. Although the
applicant stood ready to take an oath to support the Illinois Constitu-
tion, he could not do so without making certain mental reservations.
On certiorari 9 the United States Supreme Court held that the Illi-
nois interpretation of the oath, which required a willingness to serve in
the state militia, did not violate the applicant's first amendment right
to freedom of religion. The Court reached its conclusion by drawing
an analogy to cases in which applicants had been denied admission to
citizenship because they could not promise to bear arms in the mili-
tary.2" It concluded that if a promise to bear arms may be made a
prerequisite to admission to citizenship, then a state may also exact
such a promise from those charged with the administration of its laws.
Since the applicant in the Brooks case was fifty years old, his liabil-
.3 WASH. CONST. art. X, § 1.
14325 U.S. 561 (1944). In Illinois, admission to practice was considered to be a
ministerial rather than a judicial function of the Illinois Supreme Court. Consequently
the case does not appear in the Illinois Reports.
15 ILL. CONST. art. XII, § 1.
16 The Illinois Constitution, art. XII, § 6, excused those with conscientious scruples
against bearing arms from duty with the militia except in time of war.
17 Note 2 supra.
18 Note 15 supra.
19 325 U.S. 561 (1944).
20 United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931); United States v. MacIntosh, 283
U.S. 605 (1931) ; United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
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ity to service in the state militia was no longer in question. It had
ended with his forty-sixth birthday anniversary.' Thus the case does
not fall squarely within the rather narrow confines of the Summers
case.
In Washington the Oath of Attorney embraces more than obedience
to the state constitution. It includes an undertaking to support the
Constitution of the United States. The United States Constitution
places no age limitation on those liable for military service. Congress
could require military service from men of the applicant's age and
remain within the bounds of constitutional propriety. Denial of Brooks'
application might have been based upon his professed inability to obey
the United States Constitution in the event that he should be called
upon to serve in the United States Army. The eventuality that Brooks
might be called upon to serve in the United States Army is no more
remote than the possibility that Summers would have been called to
duty with the Illinois State Militia. 2 Surely the United States Supreme
Court would accord the same deference to its own interpretation of the
United States Constitution," if adopted by the Washington Supreme
Court, as it paid to the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the
Illinois Constitution in the Summers case.
To support the constitutions of the United States and of Washington
comprehends more than to obey them if called upon to do so. To sup-
port means, "to vindicate, to maintain, to defend, to uphold with aid or
countenance."2" The word in its context seems to connote an attitude
and ancillary action in support of the respective constitutions as well
as direct action in their behalf or at their call. Considering Brooks'
defiant attitude toward any service in connection with a war effort and
his expressed intent to solicit adherents to his point of view, the court
could have refused his application on the ground that he could not take
21 The Washington Constitution, art. X, § 1, made only those between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five subject to duty with the militia.
22 Summers applied for admission to the bar in 1944. The Illinois State Militia had
not been called to active duty since 1864. The Illinois Constitution, art. XII, § 1,
exempted from duty with the militia all persons made exempt by the laws of the
United States. The Selective Training and Srvice Act of 1940, note 2 supra, gave
those with conscientious scruples against bearing arms an opportunity to do civilian
work of national importance in lieu of performing military service. The Illinois Con-
stitution, art. XII, § 6, excused those with conscientious scruples against bearing arms
from duty with the militia except in time of war. Thus Summers' liability to service
with the state militia was contingent upon the militia being called to active duty, the
repeal of the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 and the continuation of
World War II past his forty-sixth birthday.
23 That is, that Congress may constitutionally require military service without re-
gard for individual scruples. United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931).24 United States v. Shulze, 253 Fed. 377, 379 (S.D. Cal. 1918).
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the Oath of Attorney despite the improbability that he would ever be
called to active service.
Had the court chosen to follow the Summers case, one less than
desirable result might have occurred. To hold the applicant unable to
take the Oath of Attorney because of his unwillingness to perform
military service would have been to disqualify all conscientious objec-
tors for the practice of law. To disqualify conscientious objectors as a
class would necessarily imply disqualification of those willing to do
work of national importance in a prescribed civilian capacity.
The applicant in the Summers case was excused from performing
combatant military service by the Selective Training and Service Act
of 1940." The case is silent, however, with respect to Summers' willing-
ness or unwillingness to perform noncombatant or civilian service.
The case is authority only for the proposition that one who would not
perform combatant service with his state militia may constitutionally
be denied admission to the bar on that account. Should the factor of
an applicant's willingness to follow a congressionally prescribed course
of conduct as a substitute for combatant military service be added to
the facts of the Summers case, there is reason to believe that the
Supreme Court would hold differently.
In Girouard v. United States,26 a naturalization proceeding, the
Supreme Court held that an oath to support and defend the Constitu-
tion from its enemies, foreign and domestic, does not include a promise
to bear arms unless Congress intends that it should. In admitting a
conscientious objector, willing to perform noncombatant service, to
citizenship, the Court overruled the earlier cases of United States v.
Bland,2 United States v. MacIntosh 8 and United States v. Schwim-
mer. 2' Denial of citizenship in the earlier cases was predicated upon
the Court's determination that the oath to defend the Constitution,
required as a prerequisite to being admitted to citizenship by the Natu-
ralization Act of 1906,3o effectively precluded anyone unwilling to bear
arms from citizenship. Whether or not Congress had intended the
25 Act of Sept. 16, 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54 Stat. 889 (now Selective Service Act of
1948, ch. 625, § 6(j), as amended, 62 Stat. 612, 50 U.S.C. § 456(j) (1952)). The act
excused those with religious scruples from bearing arms. The Illinois Constitution,
art. XII, § 1, exempted all persons made exempt by the laws of the United States,
from duty with the state militia.
26328 U.S. 61 (1946).
27283 U.S. 636 (1931).
28283 U.S. 605 (1931).
29279 U.S. 644 (1929).
ao Naturalization Act of 1906, ch. 3592, § 4, 34 Stat. 596 (now Immigration and
Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 337, 66 Stat. 258 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1958)).
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oath to have that effect was not considered. The earlier cases were
decided on the basis of the applicants' inability to take the oath with-
out mental reservation. In the Girouard case, the Court was led to
believe that in passing the Nationality Act of 1940 1 Congress intended
that the oath should not have the effect of barring conscientious objec-
tors, willing to perform noncombatant service, from citizenship. 2
Effect was given to the congressional intent and the applicant was
admitted to citizenship.
In the Girouard case the Court's decision was based on Congress'
failure to expressly provide that the oath to support and defend the
Constitution included a promise to bear arms. From this it may fairly
be inferred that the Court would give effect to an express requirement
that the applicant for citizenship promise to bear arms. It might fur-
ther be concluded that the Supreme Court would honor a state supreme
court's expressed intent, that in bar admission proceedings an oath to
support the Constitution includes a promise to bear arms. There is a
basic difference in the status of an alien seeking admission to citizen-
ship and the status of an applicant seeking admission to the bar, how-
ever. "Naturalization is a privilege, to be given, qualified, or withheld
as Congress may determine, and which the alien may claim as of right
only upon compliance with the terms which Congress imposes. 83 "A
state can require high standards of qualification, such as good moral
character or proficiency in its law, before it admits an applicant to the
bar, but any qualifications must have a rational connection with the
applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law." 4 In the Girouard case
the Court pointed out that the, "petitioner's religious scruples would
not disqualify him from becoming a member of Congress or holding
other public offices."" In the face of such a statement it seems doubt-
ful that the Court would hold that an applicant's mere refusal to
promise to bear arms makes him unfit for the practice of law.
81 Nationality Act of 1940, ch. 876, § 335, 54 Stat. 1157 (now Immigration and
Nationality Act, ch. 477, § 337, 66 Stat. 258 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1448 (1958)).
32 The Second War Powers Act, cli. 199, §§ 701-05, 56 Stat. 182 (1942), waived
certain citizenship prerequisites for persons who served honorably in the militlry
service during World War II. Persons who performed noncombatant military service
were admitted to citizenship under the act, although they were required to take an
oath substantially identical to that required by the Nationality Act of 1940, cited note
31 supra, and the Naturalization Act of 1906, cited note 30 supra. From this the Court
reasoned that Congress did not intend to require more of those who would be willing
to perform noncombatant service in the future than from those who had had an oppor-
tunity to serve in the military in the past.
88 United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 615 (1931). Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61 (1946), also proceeds on this assumption.
84 Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 239 (1957).
85 328 U.S. 61, 65 (1946).
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In the Summers case the Supreme Court held that the applicant
could constitutionally be denied admission to the Illinois Bar. Because
of his unwillingness to bear arms in the state militia and his consequent
inability to take the Oath of Attorney, he did not possess the degree of
good citizenship which a state may make a requisite to membership in
its bar. In the Girouard case the Court reexamined its criteria of what
constitutes good citizenship. Its statement that an individual may ful-
fill his obligations of citizenship without shouldering a rifle raises doubt
as to whether a state may now deny an applicant admission to its bar
because of his unwillingness to bear arms in the state militia or the
United States Army. The Court's recitation of noncombatant military
service and civilian work of national importance as means by which a
citizen may discharge his duties of citizenship indicates that a willing-
ness to bear arms is not an essential feature of good citizenship.
It is clear from the Summers case that a state may require that the
members of its bar be good citizens. While the Court appears to have
changed its concept of what constitutes good citizenship in the
Girouard case, one who has denied every duty to serve his country in
time of war could hardly meet even the newly defined standards. Thus
the Summers case would still probably be authority for denying admis-
sion to the applicant in the Brooks case, since he had denied any duty
to his country in time of war.
From the Brooks case it is clear that an applicant who denies any
duty to promote a war effort will not be admitted to the bar in Wash-
ington. The admissibility of an applicant who refuses to bear arms
but who is willing to perform noncombatant service has not been de-
cided. Both the concurring and dissenting opinions in the Brooks case
express fear that the rather broad majority opinion equates conscien-
tious objection with bad moral character per se. 6 There are factors
which militate against such a conclusion, however. One is the very
narrow context in which the case came before the court. The applicant
had refused to perform military service and had been convicted of a
felony for his refusal to do civilian work of national importance. An-
other is the language used in the majority opinion. "On the debit side
of the ledger is his felonious denial of any duty related to the enjoy-
ment of these individual liberties." (Emphasis added to "any".)3 7
The opinion continues, decrying the applicant's failure to sense a duty,
86 In re Brooks, 156 Wash. Dec. 773, 780, 783, 355 P.2d 840, 844, 845 (1960).
5
1 Id. at 776, 355 P.2d at 842.
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without ever designating it a duty to perform military service or to
bear arms.
The court based its holding on the applicant's moral duty to share
in the preservation of his heritage of liberty, rather than upon his po-
tential constitutional duty to perform military service. By doing so it
appears to have postponed to another day the question of the admissi-
bility of conscientious objectors willing to do civilian work of national
importance or to perform noncombatant military service.
LEON MIsTEREK
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Constitutional Right to Counsel. The opinions of the United States
Supreme Court1 have shown basic differences among the members of
the Court as to the duty of a court to provide counsel for an accused
to meet the constitutional requirements of the sixth2 or fourteenth3
amendments. Recent cases decided by the Washington Supreme Court
under the state constitution and statutes indicate the same split of
philosophy as to the degree of protection necessary. It appears that
the Washington court has now adopted a more liberal position which
will demand greater care by trial courts in protecting the rights of
indigent prisoners. While the position of the United States Supreme
Court will be briefly considered,' the purpose of this note is to bring
'Contrast the opinions of Mr. Justice Black in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 344
(1957) (dissent) and Mr. Justice Douglas in Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 448
1958) (dissent) with those of Mr. Justice Jackson in Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49,
58 (1949) (concurring), Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949) (dissent), and
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949) (dissent).
2"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have the
assistance of counsel for his defense." This applies only to trials in federal courts.
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
8 "Nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due
process of law." This amendment does not incorporate, as such, the specific guarantee
of the sixth amendment. Betts v. Brady, supra note 2; In re Gensburg v. Smith, 35
Wn.2d 849, 215 P2d 880 (1950).
'The standards in determining whether failure of the state court to provide counsel
to a defendant at trial and for a reasonable time prior to trial violates due process
under the fourteenth amendment, vary in capital and non-capital cases. In capital
cases, Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) established the rule that the trial court
has an affirmative responsibility to provide counsel to an accused person who does not
have one, unless he intelligently waives his legal right to such assistance. See also
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948). In non-capital cases, however, the refusal of a
state court to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant is not necessarily a denial of
due process. Under the fourteenth amendment, states are only required to afford
assistance of counsel when there are special circumstances, such as extreme youth,
ignorance, or an offense of a particularly complicated nature. MORELAND, MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, Ch. 12 (1959); Note, 38 Ky. L.J. 317, 320 (1950). "In the
great majority of the states, it has been the considered judgment of the... courts that
appointment of counsel is not a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial." Betts v.
Brade, 316 U.S. 455, 471 (1942). In Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948) a 57 year old
19611
